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PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to record the technical evaluation of the Operational Safety Requirements described in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Final (PFP) Operational Safety Requirements, WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010. Rev. 0-N , Section 3.1 .I, "Criticality Prevention System." This document, with its appendices, provides the following:
1.
The results of a review of Criticality Safety Analysis Reports (CSAR), later called Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSER). and Criticality Prevention Specifications (CPS) to determine which equipment or components analyzed in the CSER or CPS are considered as one of the two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes before a criticality accident is possible.
Evaluations of equipment or components to determine the safety boundary for the system (Section 4).
2.

3.
A list of essential drawings that show the safety system or component (Appendix A).
4.
5.
A list of the safety envelope (SE) equipment (Appendix B).
Functional requirements for the individual safety envelope equipment (Sections 3 and 4).
A list of the operational and surveillance procedures necessary to maintain the system equipment within the safety envelope (Section 5).
6.
BACKGROUND
The Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSER) and associated Criticality Prevention Specifications (CPS) were reviewed to determine if an equipment or system failure considered in the analysis as one of the two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes required before a criticality accident is possible had been included in specifications, procedures, and surveillance.
The CSERs take into consideration and use various factors as error or failure parameters. These include:
Geometrically favorable equipment, Maximum fissile masses, Moderation control, Maximum single container volume and mass, Maximum total volume and mass, Minimum spacing between containers, Maximum glovebox solids accumulation, Criticality drains, Maximum solids in tanks, Plutonium solution pH to control polymerization, Expeditious spill cleanup, and
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Fissile material content of glovebox gloves.
The parameters are addressed in each CSER to assure that after one failurelerror contingency the system will remain subcritical. These parameters and the calculations that establish their CPS limits were not inspected during this review. The review was concerned only with the identification of any specified physical or mechanical item evaluated as one of the two allowed events or contingencies and that the item identified was properly included in essential design drawings, the CSER, the CPS, and surveillance procedures.
SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) requirements for the Criticality Prevention System are: 
3.3
The following criticality safety features shall be in place. Compliance with the requirements in the LCO, CPS and CSER are ensured by monthly inspections of the plant, equipment and criticality prevention postings; performance of functional tests; and compliance with procedural requirements. If the LCO, CPS or CSER requirements are not met, affected fissionable materials operations are immediately halted, specified notifications made, and a recovery plan is prepared and approved.
4.1 SAFETY ENVELOPE EQUIPMENT
Based on the review performed, there are several specific physical components or systems that must be present and/or operable to prevent criticality afler the occurrence of a failure contingency. These are:
. Automatic shutdown and isolation features of the 26-inch Hg Process Vacuum System, Glovebox sump discs or floor filler plates used to limit glovebox solution depths before overnow,
0
. The Raschig rings used in the HC-6 overflow tank system in Room 166 0
Glovebox criticality drains
Since these systems and component are considered to be present to prevent a criticality. they are Safety Class items in accordance with HNF-PRO-704. CSER evaluations have assumed that these items are present and operable. A more detailed description of these items is presented below.
26-INCH HG PROCESS VACUUM SYSTEM AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN AND ISOLATION FEATURES (CSER 78-013 AND CPS 80141)
Accidental criticality could occur in the 26-inch process vacuum HEPA filters if a solution containing plutonium were to enter the HEPA filterbox.
The possibility of accidental criticality is reduced by providing one engineered contingency (26-inch process vacuum interlock system) and administrative controls (PFP Operating Procedures) governing the use of the vacuum system for liquid transfers.
Further details on the 26-inch Hg Process Vacuum System, including procedures and surveillance, are provided in HNF-SD-CP-SDD-013, Definition and Means of Maintaining the Process Vacuum Liquid Detection Interlock Systems Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope.
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GLOVEBOX SUMP AND FLOOR FILLERS
Glovebox sump and floor tillers have been installed to limit the solution depth to the criticality drain ovefflows and to fill 11-inch diameter by 2-inch deep sumps. These are Safety Class items. The initial CSER 79-024 evaluation and a subsequent reevaluation, CSER 87-005, assumed that an 11-inch diameter, 2-inch thick stainless steel disc would be in place to fill the floor sump in glovebox HC-7. The sump filler disc is located by H-2-93504-3, EFD, RMC Line and described in H-2-24640 Sheets 1 and 2, Sump Probes for Gloveboxes. The disc's presence is verified by procedure ZSE-72-001, Perform Monthly Criticality Drain Inspection that requires a visual check that the disc is in place. If and when the glovebox is reactivated, a supplemental check of the sump tiller disk check will be added to a more frequently performed procedure.
Glovebox
Glovebox HC-9B, Room 228A (CSARs 79-019 and 87-005, and CPS 80609)
A sump disc as described for HC-7 above is also required in HC-9B by the CPS. The disc is located by H-2-93504-3, EFD, RMC Line and described in drawing H-2-24640 Sheets 1 and 2. The verification surveillance is the same as for the HC-7 disc above.
Glovebox HC-6, Room 166 (CSAR 79-018 and 79-022 and CPS 80606)
Plates on glovebox HC-6 floor (1-1/2-inch + l/4-inch thick Lexan' and stainless steel) are required by the CPS to maintain a safe slab in event of leakage. CPS 80606 and CSER 79-022 specify the plates. Drawing H-2-19405, ECN 500050 shows the plates location.
Inactive Gloveboxes (MT-3, H-7A and H-9A)
The CSERs for these gloveboxes require steel sump discs in the bottom to prevent exceeding a safe slab thickness before overflow to the criticality drain. All of these gloveboxes are out of service and respective CPSs are no longer needed. The gloveboxes are posted to prevent the addition, movement, storage, or removal of materials. New CSERs and CPS will be required to do any of the above or to start processing in MT-3, H-7A or H-9A.
If any of these gloveboxes are returned to service the sump fillers shall become Safety Class equipment and shall be added to the Safety Equipment List based upon the new CSER and CPS.
is a trademark of General Electric Co.
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RASCHIG RINGS IN GLOVEBOX HC-6, OVERFLOW TANK SYSTEM (CSER 79-018 AND 79-022 AND CPS 80606)
The CSER and CPS require the two HC-6 overtlow tank floor pits in Room 166 near HC-6 be filled with Raschig rings to prevent criticality in case of box overflow through the criticality drains in Room 166. Drawing H-2-25598 specifies the rings. All calculations in the CSERs assumed the rings to be present. The HC-6 storage tanks are blanked off and are not presently in use but solution transfers are made through this box. The HC-4 Glovebox criticality drain is also located near the floor pits. Gloveboxes marked with an asterisk v) are equipped with sump alarms at approximately 1/2-inch above the floor level to alert the operators before the criticality drain ovemow is reached. These sump alarms do not perform safety function, however these sump alarms are tested before liquid transfers and periodically when solutions are present under PM 2222134.
The MT-5 and MT-6 gloveboxes are connected to the PRF process portion of the PFP closed loop cooling system. The MT processes are currently inactive and have no future use scheduled. Should future plans require the use of the process features, technical documents will be revised and reissued.
Several gloveboxes with criticality drains are out of service and posted to prevent the addition, movement, storage or removal of material. CPS-Z-165-80010 establishes that if + a n y of the gloveboxes listed below are returned to service, their criticality drain(s) shall become Safety Class equipment and shall be added to the Safety Equipment List unless additional CSERs are prepared to prove the criticality drains are not required. - Due to operational changes over time, alterations to Gloveboxes HC91A and HC-21C have resulted in depressions below floor level which have some potential to accumulate fissile materials or wastes. Like other gloveboxes connected indirectly to the criticality drains in HC-1 and HC-5, gloveboxes HC-21A and HC-21C handle only dry materials. Glovebox structure and exclusion of piping inside the gloveboxes preclude liquid entry under normal and most abnormal conditions. Material mass limits are used to ensure all areas in the gloveboxes would remain sub-critical even if fully moderated materials should accumulate. Filler blocks are in place in HCQIA to ensure liquids entering the depression drain to the HC-2 conveyor without exceeding volume limits. An isolation plate installed in HC91C ensures that normal process materials cannot enter the depression in that glovebox. The blocks and plate are categorized as Safety Significant equipment; they are part of defense-in-depth provided by numerous criticality prevention limits and controls.
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5.1
The LCO 3.1.1 Bases Backaround establishes that the LCO is aDDliCable to "active" criticality safetv features (i.e.. those that could readilv be misconfiaured durina routine plant ooerations or bv cornoonent failure). Numerous criticalitv safetv analvsis or criticalitv safetv evaluation reDorts (CSARs and CSERs) credit "Dassive" criticalitv safety features such as seismic aualification of aloveboxes or sDacinalaeometrv of tanks or vessels for Dreventina a criticality continaencv. Control of "passive" criticalitv safety features is Drovided bv OSR Administrative Controls (ACs) 5.1 0. "Facilitv Chanae Control". 5.1 1. "Unreviewed Safetv Questions". and 5.1 5. "Nuclear Criticality Safetv".
The CSERs for the maanesium hvdroxide DreciDitation Drocess utilize Dassive enaineered features that Drovide aeometricallv favorable fissile material distributions within Gloveboxes HC-230C-3 and HC-230C-4. These criticalitv desian features are Safetv Class because thev are relied w o n to maintain double continaencv Drotection aaainst an accidental nuclear criticalitv. In Darticular. for Gloveboxes HC-230C-3 and HC-230C-4. the external structural framework fincludina floor anchors). DreciDitator tank and filtrate tank inner diameters. inner heiahts. intra-tank sDacina. and filter basin diameter and heiaht both above and below the filter plate. as well as criticalitv drains are identified. The enaineerina drawinas for these aloveboxes and details are included in the the SDD ADDendix A OSR ComDliance Sheet for comDleteness.
SAFETY ENVELOPE PROCEDURES
Safety envelope (ZSE) procedures provide administrative control over the operation, maintenance, and surveillance of process equipment to maintain the operability of safety envelope components. ZSE procedures also provide for proper response to alarms resulting from abnormal conditions and/or equipment failures. In addition, the procedures identified below satisfy criticality prevention specifications and provide operators with instructions and precautions related to the presence and operation of the criticality prevention design features identified in this document.
26-INCH HG VACUUM SYSTEM
Operation, maintenance and surveillance procedures which satisfy CPS-2-165-80141 
SUMP AND FLOOR FILLERS
Procedure ZO-100-400, Perform Nuclear Operations Surveillance and Responses are performed on regularly scheduled workdays. During procedure performance visual inspections of gloveboxes are made which would detect an obviously off-standard condition which would include missing sump or floor fillers in gloveboxes HC-6, HC-7 and HC-9B. This satisfies CPS-Z-165-80607, Glovebox HC-7: Feed Preparation; CPS-Z-165-80609, Glovebox HC-9B: Continuous Nitrate to Oxide Conversion; and CPS-Z-165-80606, Glovebox HC-6: Solution Transfer. If and when glovebox processes are reactivated, more detailed supplemental checks of sump and floor fillers will be added to procedures that are performed more frequently than the ZSE inspections.
Surveillance Requirement 3.1 .I .3.1 is satisfied by performing ZSE-72-001, Perform Monthly Criticality Drain Inspection.
RASCHIG RINGS-GLOVEBOX HC-6 OVERFLOW TANK SYSTEM, ROOM 166
CRITICALITY DRAINS
Procedure ZO-100-400, Perform Nuclear Operations Surveillance and Responses are performed on regularly scheduled workdays. During procedure performance visual inspections of gloveboxes are made which would detect an obviously off-standard condition which would include solutions in excess of criticality prevention specification limits discovered standing in glovebox bays or on floors indicating a restricted criticality drain. This satisfies CPS-Z-165-80010, General Limits, and CPS-L-114-00010, Laboratory Uniform General Limits. If and when glovebox processes are reactivated, more detailed supplemental checks of criticality drains will be added to procedures that are performed more frequently than the ZSE inspections.
Procedure ZO-180-040, Test MT Criticality Drains, performs a monthly flow check of the MT-5 and MT-6 criticality drains to verify the drains are free flowing and not plugged.
This procedure does not have to be performed to satisfy SR 3.1.1.2.1. It is an optional procedure performed to comply with good engineering practice and may not be performed when the MT-5 and MT-6 gloveboxes are not being used for processing.
Plant Operating Procedures for gloveboxes with criticality drains include criticality safety cautions concerning criticality drain operability and/or water flow limitations into the glovebox. The complete list of these procedures is provided as Attachment 1 of Appendix A.
Surveillance Requirement 3.1 .I .2.1 is satisfied by performing ZSE-72-001, Perform Monthly Criticality Drain Inspection.
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